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operate at the earliest date the law would allow it to operate?" The court then
answered this question by saying that:
"It is dangerous for us to insert an exception by saying that if the landlord had
knowledge of that tenant's intention it stands for notice. I have struggled to find a
justification for adopting it (defenses line of reasoning), as the payment of the whole
rent by the defendants, without any return, works a hardship, which all the members
of the court appreciate; but I am compelled to say that to decide against the plaintiffs
would be to fly in the face of practically a unanimity of authorities through several
hundred years in all quarters where the common law rules." 22
In a recent Montana decision,23 the Montana court followed the common law
by holding that a notice by the lessors to terminate a tenancy from month to
month, served April 15 and requesting possession May 1 was insufficient, under
a statute requiring 30 days notice, where the lessor after serving this notice,
moved into the premises on June 25, 1949, and occupied the living room thereof
for 17 days. The court found the lessor liable for intentional, wrongful and ma-
licious invasion of right of privacy, trespass and entry. The court's conclusion,
although not stated as such, impliedly was that the notice in question was not
only insufficient to terminate the tenancy on May 1 as designated, but was a
nullity for all purposes and therefore the tenancy was still in effect on June 25,
one month and a half later, the date of lessor's trespass.
As stated above, previous California decisions do not give an answer to the
question. They declare that it is necessary that proper notice be given to termi-
nate a tenancy from month to month, but proceed no further.
Considering the growing prevalency of periodic tenancies today, and their
historical background indicating the desire of the courts to further stabilize such
tenancies, the California court may have established a dangerous precedent in
the principal case. Perhaps the legislature can take steps to amend section 1946
of the Civil Code so as to provide a clear and concise answer to the problem,
thereby preventing the reoccurrence of any further transformations of an in-
sufficient notice into a sufficient notice.
Raymond A. Greene Jr.
TORTS: LAST CLEAR CHANCE--PEDESTRIAN NoT IN A POSInION oF
DANGER AS A MATTER OF LAW
In Ferner v. Casalegno the question raised was whether as a matter of law
the plaintiff had reached a position of danger; and if so whether he could have
escaped from such a position by the use of ordinary care. The facts of that case
were as follows: the plaintiff while intoxicated attempted to walk across a divided
four lane highway in the middle of the night at a point other than atan intersection
or crosswalk. Plaintiff admitted that he marched straight ahead without looking
to the right or left, crossed two southbound lanes, the double white line, and
continued to a point in the outsidei.aorthbound lane where he was struck by
defendant's automobile. Defendant testified that he first observed the plaintiff
at the double white line proceeding at a rapid pace. The defendant applied his
brakes and continued straight ahead to the point of impact. On appeal from a
judgment for the defendant the court held:
Id. at 585, 50 S.E. at 815.
23 Welsh v. Pritchard, 125 Mont. 517, 241 P.2d 816 (1952).
1141 Cal.App.2d_....... 297 P.2d 91 (1956).
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"[T]hat a pedestrian who crossed a double white line in the center of a four lane
highway 3.4 seconds before he was struck by an automobile in the outside lane toward
which the plaintiff was walking was not, as a matter of law, in a position of danger
within the Last Clear Chance doctrine when pedestrian crossed such double white line
and therefore, pedestrian was not entitled to recover under the doctrine as a matter
of law."
2
Whether or not the doctrine of Last Clear Chance applies in a particular
case depends wholly upon the existence or nonexistence of the elements necessary
to bring it into play. What are these elements? The doctrine presupposes: (1)
That the plaintiff has been negligent, and as a result thereof is in a position of
danger from which he cannot escape by the exercise of ordinary care; this is not
limited to situations where it is physically impossible for him to escape, but is
applicable to cases where he is totally unaware of his danger and for that reason
unable to escape; (2) that the defendant has knowledge that the plaintiff is in
such a situation, and knows, or in the exercise of ordinary care should know that
the plaintiff cannot escape from such a situation; and (3) that the defendant has
the last clear chance to avoid the accident by exercising ordinary care, fails to
exercise same, and the plaintiff is injured as the proximate result of such failure.
3
If any one of these elements is absent, the doctrine does not apply and the
case is governed by the ordinary rules of negligence and contributory negligence.
4
In the Casalegno case the court held that the evidence failed to establish the
second part of the first element, that is, the plaintiff was not, as a matter of law,
in a position of danger when he crossed the double white line. Thus, while the
plaintiff may be in danger or peril, i.e., he may simply be exposed to injury, that
may not be enough to constitute a "position of danger." To come within the doc-
trine of Last Clear Chance, a plaintiff must be exposed to an injury from which
he cannot extricate himself by exercising ordinary care. And until he has reached
this position he has the same opportunity to avoid the accident by exercise of
ordinary care as has the defendant. 5 On the other hand, if the defendant observes
the plaintiff in a position where, with the exercise of reasonable care upon his part,
no injury will befall him, the defendant has the right, until circumstances clearly
indicate the contrary, to assume that the plaintiff will not expose himself to dan-
ger.6 In other words, the defendant is under no duty to anticipate that the plain-
tiff will leave a place of safety for one of danger. Even though the defendant has
seen the plaintiff, he need not take measures to avert injury until it is reasonably
apparent that the plaintiff is in danger because of obliviousness? inadvertance, or
impossibility of self-help.7
To illustrate what is meant by "position of danger" under this doctrine, some
of the leading cases on the subject should be noted. In Dalley v. Williamss the
court said:
"The Last Clear Chance doctrine was not applicable until the plaintiff arrived
at such a point as to be in peril and this was the point where he could no longer
escape injury by exercising ordinary care." 9
2 Id. at ........,297 P.2d at 91.
8 Doran v. San Francisco, 44 Cal.2d 477, 283 P.2d 1 (1955).
4 Girdner v. Union Oil Co., 216 Cal. 197, 13 P.2d 915 (1932).
5 Brown v. McCuan, 56 Cal.App.2d 35, 132 P.2d 838 (1942).
6 Cady v. Sanford, 57 CalApp. 218, 207 Pac. 45 (1922); Schooley v. Fresno Traction
Co., 56 Cal.App. 705, 206 Pac. 481 (1922) ; 19 CAL. JuR., Negligence § 81 (1925).
7 See 21 CALip. L. RaV. 257 (1933).
8 73 Cal.App.2d 427, 166 P.2d 595 (1946).
9 Id. at 435, 166 P.2d at 599.
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And in Cady v. Sanford10 it was said:
"At some appreciable time prior to the crash the plaintiff was in a position of
peril. He was in a position of peril at the very instant he arrived at the point where
he could no longer avoid the accident by exercising ordinary care. Then and not
until then was the Last Clear Chance doctrine applicable.' 1
In applying the rules of these cases to Ferner v. Casalegno, it seems clear that
it cannot be said as a matter of law that the plaintiff uncontrovertably was shown
to be in a position of danger from which he could not escape by the exercise of
ordinary care. Rather, it would seem to be a factual question for the jury, as the
court held.
It may be that the Last Clear Chance doctrine is limited to exceptional cir-
cumstances in its application to accidents involving automobiles or automobiles
and pedestrians. In such cases the act creating the peril occurs practically simul,
taneously with the collision and the defendant frequently does not have the oppor-
tunity in the exercise of reasonable care to avert the accident.
Marvin G. Haun
10 57 CalApp. 218, 207 Pac. 45 (1922).
11 Id. at 224, 207 Pac. at 48.
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